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Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of global oil prices on Russia’s economic growth and 
its growth rate in terms of output. It also reviews the mechanics of the long-term and 
short-term impacts on output resulting from changes in oil prices. The authors argue that 
the effect of oil prices on output has decreased dramatically under current economic con-
ditions ever since the period of recovery growth in the early 2000s. The main conclusion 
of the paper is that, on the basis of classical models , a constant increase in oil prices 
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transitional trends from one long-term equilibrium to another.
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1. Introduction
Global oil prices are the most important external economic factor for the Russian 
economy. The contemporary academic literature lacks consensus on the nature 
and extent of the impact that oil prices have on Russia’s economic growth and 
the correlation between the GDP growth rate and oil prices.
,Q WKHV EHIRUH WKHJOREDO¿QDQFLDO FULVLV RI  DQG H[SORVLYH
economic growth coincided with dramatic increases in global oil prices. This 
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observation served to form the common opinion that higher oil prices boost eco-
QRPLF JURZWK+RZHYHU LQ WKHFXUUHQW HFRQRPLF VLWXDWLRQ LQ  DQG 
when oil prices are higher than the long-term annual average over the past decade , 
the growth rate in output is critically low; consequently, a simple extrapolation 
of the events of the early 2000s may lead to a misinterpretation of the current 
economic situation, to conceptually controversial forecasts of future economic 
GHYHORSPHQWDQGDVDUHVXOWWRLQHI¿FLHQWHFRQRPLFSROLF\
Discussion of the correlation between output growth in the Russian economy and 
oil prices should be based on a formal economic and mathematical construct and built 
upon basic models of economic growth. Otherwise, a purely qualitative and empirical 
analysis of current events over a very short time span may produce  conclusions and 
econometric dependencies that are inconsistent with economic theory.
The goal of this paper is to discuss the theoretical basis for the correlation be-
tween the Russian economy’s output and global oil prices from both a short-term 
and long-term perspective. Understanding this correlation and identifying the ba-
sic mechanics of the impacts that oil prices have on economic development will 
allow for a reconsideration of the reasons for the current slowdown in GDP growth 
and for a plan to accelerate it (or to hold back the slowdown) to be developed.
The mechanics of the negative impacts that increasing global commodity pric-
es have on the economic development of resource-rich countries in the context 
of the Dutch disease have been described in detail in both the Russian (see e.g., 
*DLGDU &K*XULHYDQG6RQLQ.QREHO 0DX DQG
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVHHHJ%UXQRDQG6DFKV*\OIDVRQ0HKOXPHWDO
6DFKV:DUQHU6DODL0DUWLQOLWHUDWXUH7KHPHFKDQLFV
of oil prices impact on macroeconomic dynamics are also studied in detail and 
described in the literature. In particular, a number of studies show how the 
short-term positive effect of oil prices growth is combined with the long-term 
QHJDWLYH RQH VHH H J &pVSHGHV9HODVFR  /HVFDURX[0LJQRQ 
.RUKRQHQ/HG\DHYD&ROOLHU*RGHULV,QVSLWHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
both positive and negative effects of the terms of trade impact on the economy, 
this paper focuses on describing the logic behind the positive correlation between 
the Russian economy’s output and global oil prices.1
2. Economic growth due to capital accumulation in the Solow model
When considering the potential impact of global oil prices on GDP in the con-
WH[WRI6RORZ¶VQHRFODVVLFDOPRGHORIHFRQRPLFJURZWKRQHVKRXOGEHDU
in mind that a long-term dependency of Russia’s GDP on global oil prices can 
only be proven through the mechanism of capital accumulation. This  approach 
ZDV XVHG LQ WKHIROORZLQJ ZRUNV .D]DNRYD HW DO  .D]DNRYD DQG
6LQHOQLNRY0XU\OHY.D]DNRYD
The basic Solow model assumes a constant growth rate in the population ( labor) 
and in labor productivity. It also assumes that an exogenously determined share of 
 1 7KHUHVXOWVRIDQXPEHURIHPSLULFDOSDSHUVVHHHJ$LYD]\DQDQG%URGVN\$LYD]\DQHWDO
.D]DNRYD HW DO  .D]DNRYD DQG 6LQHOQLNRY0XU\OHY  6XQL  ,WR  .XERQLZD 
Rautava, 2004, 2013) are evidence of a positive relationship between global oil prices and the output of 
WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\%HQHGLFWRZHWDO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changes in the terms of trade as well as a major potential of its growth in the absence of oil prices growth.
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RXWSXWLVVDYHGDQG²DIWHUDPRUWL]DWLRQ²DOORFDWHGWRDFFXPXODWLQJ¿[HGFDSLWDO
The main effect of the model is the existence of a steady-state path of economic 
growth with a constant capital–labor ratio per worker2 in the economy.
On a steady-state path, physical capital and output increase at a constant rate 
equal to the sum of the growth rate of labor productivity and the population growth 
rate. Savings on this path are fully spent to cover the amortization of capital and to 
supply new capital to sustain a constant capital–labor ratio per worker.
According to the Solow model, this means that the long-term economic 
growth rate is only affected by the growth rate in the population and that of 
technological progress. Changing the saving rate will not affect the long-term 
economic growth rate but will have an impact only on the stationary capital–
labor ratio and on the short-term output trend regarding the transition to a new 
VWDWLRQDU\VWDWHLQVSHFL¿FLQGLFDWRUV,IDQHFRQRPLFV\VWHPLVRQDVWHDG\VWDWH
growth path and the saving rate is constantly increasing, when the transition is 
complete, the system will settle into a new equilibrium growth path, where out-
put will undoubtedly be higher than in the case of a low saving rate,3 but its 
growth rate will remain the same.
%\K\SRWKHWLFDOO\H[SDQGLQJWKH6RORZPRGHODQGSUHWHQGLQJWKDWWKHHFRQRP\
consists of two sectors — oil and non-oil — we will assume that the economy is 
on a steady-state path of economic growth at a rate equal to the sum of the popu-
lation and labor productivity growth rates. We will further assume rising global 
oil prices. On the whole, this increase can be interpreted as a transfer of wealth 
from abroad, which can be spent either on consumption or on investments. Thus, 
increasing oil prices provide an additional source of investment funding, which 
may have a positive impact on accumulated capital within the domestic economy 
and, consequently, on the physical output of products and services. At the same 
time, it is important to answer the following question: does an increase in oil 
prices change the long-term growth rate or long-term GDP level?
Assuming that part of the extra income from the increasing oil prices is invested 
in the domestic economy, the mechanics of the impact on the rate of change in 
the real GDP will be similar to the growth of the saving rate in the basic Solow 
PRGHOZLWKRXWGLYLGLQJWKHHFRQRP\LQWRVHFWRUV7RNHHSLWVLPSOHZHZLOO¿UVW
consider the case where the population is not growing and technological progress 
is non-existent (i.e., a zero economic growth rate in the long term). Thus, invest-
ments will be exactly equal to capital amortization on an equilibrium path.
With rising global oil prices, savings will increase and exceed the retirement of 
capital. Capital will thus begin to grow. As capital is accumulated, the economy 
will increase the output of its oil exports and other sectors, leading to extra growth 
in savings and an additional contribution to increasing capital on a steady-state 
path. Due to the declining marginal productivity of capital, each additional unit 
of capital will provide an increasingly smaller contribution to output growth and 
to incremental savings. Accordingly, the capital accumulation process will follow 
a certain new path where amortization and investments will converge. This means 
 2 )RUWKHVDNHRIVLPSOLFLW\DQGEUHYLW\WKLVSDSHULQWHUSUHWVWKHFDSLWDO±ODERUUDWLRSHUZRUNHUDVDVSHFL¿F
LQGLFDWRUUHÀHFWLQJWKHUDWLRRISK\VLFDOFDSLWDOWRWKHQXPEHURIZRUNHUVDQGWRWKHSURGXFWLYLW\HI¿FLHQF\SHU
worker.
 3 This is due to population growth during the transition and as a result of increased output per worker on 
a new steady-state growth path.
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that rising oil prices will lead to a change in output while leaving its long-term 
growth rate constant.
In a more general case, when the population is growing at a certain rate and 
there is technological progress, the increase of savings from rising global oil 
prices will lead to an improvement in the capital–labor ratio per worker. In other 
words, on a new equilibrium path, with higher oil prices, the level of capital per 
worker and the level of output will increase, whereas the economic growth rate 
will remain the same and equal the sum of the population and productivity growth 
rates. At the same time, from a short-term perspective, i.e., during the transition 
from one steady-state path to another, we will indeed observe an accelerated rate 
RIHFRQRPLFJURZWKGXHWRLQFUHDVHGVSHFL¿FLQGLFDWRUV
5HWXUQVRQLQYHVWPHQWVLQ¿[HGFDSLWDOLQDQRSHQHFRQRP\
The above — quite simple — mechanics of the impact that increasing oil prices 
KDYHRQVKRUWWHUPDQGORQJWHUPRXWSXWDUHDJURVVRYHUVLPSOL¿FDWLRQSDUWLFX-
ODUO\GXHWRWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWDD¿[HGH[RJHQRXVO\GHWHUPLQHGVKDUHRILQ-
come of economic agents is saved and (b) completely allocated for accumulating 
domestic capital. Accordingly, based on those assumptions, rising global oil 
prices will lead to investing part of the extra revenues in physical capital and 
output growth due to physical capital growth. In a small open economy with free 
FDSLWDO ÀRZV4 where domestic economic agents can gain access to the global 
¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWWKHVHDVVXPSWLRQVVHHPTXLWHGLVSXWDEOH
,QDVPDOORSHQHFRQRP\ZLWK IUHHFDSLWDOÀRZVDQGZLWK UHWXUQVDQG ULVNV
determined by the market, economic agents should not care about which assets 
to invest in, whether foreign or domestic securities or domestic physical capital, 
and, accordingly, risk-adjusted returns on investments in domestic physical capi-
tal should converge with risk-adjusted returns on investments in foreign assets.5 
This leads to the conclusion that an increase in capital and output in the long term 
against increasing global oil prices will only happen if the growth in oil prices 
exceeds the rate of return from investments in the domestic economy.6
 4 7KH )HOGVWHLQ±+RULRND SDUDGR[ )HOGVWHLQ DQG +RULRND  FDQ TXHVWLRQ KLJK PRELOLW\ RI JOREDO
capital. According to the authors, if the assumption of high mobility of global capital is met, the correlation 
EHWZHHQWKHVDYLQJUDWHDQGWKHLQYHVWPHQWUDWHVKRXOGEHLQVLJQL¿FDQWIRUDSDUWLFXODUHFRQRP\DVGRPHVWLF
investments may (if necessary) be funded with foreign capital, whereas the surplus of domestic savings may 
EHLQYHVWHGLQWKHJOREDO¿QDQFLDOPDUNHW+RZHYHUHPSLULFDOGDWDIURPDODUJHVDPSOHRIFRXQWULHVSRLQWWR
DFORVHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKRVHYDULDEOHV)HOGVWHLQDQG+RULRND)RUPRUHRQWKHPRGHUQDVSHFWVRI
WKH)HOGVWHLQ±+RULRNDSDUDGR[VHHHJ=XEDUHYDQG7UXQLQ
 5 7KHUHDVRQLQJLQWKLVSDUWRIWKHSDSHUZLOODOVREHWUXHLQWKHFDVHRIDVOLJKWH[SDQVLRQRIWKH6RORZ
PRGHO WRDPRGHOIRUDQRLOH[SRUWLQJVPDOORSHQHFRQRP\ZLWKIUHHFDSLWDOÀRZV LQZKLFK WKHVDYLQJVRI
economic agents are determined exogenously, as well as in the case of a slight expansion of the Ramsey model 
5DPVH\ZKHUHWKHVDYLQJVRIHFRQRPLFDJHQWVDUHQRWGHWHUPLQHGH[RJHQRXVO\EXWE\HFRQRPLFDJHQWV
inside the model, maximizing anticipated discounted utility.
 6 Assuming that rising oil prices do not lead to an improvement in returns on domestic capital, investing an 
additional unit of money in domestic capital at the same rate of return will increase its size, which will decrease 
the marginal product and reduce the returns of the domestic economy below the global interest rate. In this case, 
WKHEHVWFKRLFHIRUHFRQRPLFDJHQWVZRXOGEHWRDOORFDWHDGGLWLRQDOIXQGVLQWKHJOREDO¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWZKLFK
KDVODUJHHQRXJKFDSDFLW\WRDOORZLQYHVWPHQWVZLWKRXWUHGXFLQJJOREDOUHWXUQV+RZHYHUDVVXPLQJWKDWDQ
LQFUHDVHLQRLOSULFHVOHDGVWRDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHUDWHRIUHWXUQRQGRPHVWLFFDSLWDOHFRQRPLFDJHQWVZLOO¿QG
LWSUR¿WDEOHWRLQYHVWLQWKHGRPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGSRVVLEO\HYHQZLWKGUDZWKHLULQYHVWPHQWVIURPWKHJOREDO
market until the rates of return converge again.
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The potential for increase of the rate of return for the national economy due 
to rising oil prices is easily interpreted: the growth of commodity prices (e.g., 
crude oil or petroleum products) in particular sectors of the economy in relation 
to the prices of investment goods will increase the real returns on investments in 
those sectors of the economy.
In the case of the standard assumption of declining marginal product from 
using the factors of production, such additional investment will lead to a lower 
marginal product of capital and, accordingly, to a lower rate of return on invest-
ments in the real sector. In other words, if the increase in global oil prices leads 
to growth in relative prices of end products in a particular sector, then capital 
will continue to increase in that sector until the marginal product of capital falls 
to a level where the real return on capital converges with the real global interest 
rate. For example, an increase in global oil prices directly leads to an increase in 
the prices of end products in the oil-producing sector, while higher oil prices may 
PDNHQHZ¿HOGVZLWKKLJKHU SURGXFWLRQ FRVWV SUR¿WDEOH OHDGLQJ WR DGGLWLRQDO
investment in the sector.7
Thus, in a long-term equilibrium, higher oil prices will correspond to a higher 
level of capital and production in the oil-producing sector. Returns may also in-
crease in industries closely connected with the oil-producing process, including 
those engaged in oil transportation, pipe manufacturing, etc. If the increase in 
global oil prices is accompanied by rising prices for all other energy resources, 
we will witness an increase in the output of respective industries, such as natural 
gas and coal.
Rising global oil prices will indirectly cause an increase in the ratio of domestic 
non-tradable goods prices to those of imported products, assuming that these two 
types of products are imperfect substitutes. This will happen as a result of rising 
global oil prices through household expenses, leading to an increase in the demand 
for domestic as well as imported goods. The supply curve for imported products 
in the case of a small open economy is horizontal, while the supply curve for 
domestic non-tradable goods is positively inclined due to the limited nature of 
certain factors of production, particularly labor. Thus, the growth of aggregate 
demand by households will lead to an increase in the relative prices of non- 
tradable goods compared with imports.
,IDVLJQL¿FDQWVKDUHRILQYHVWPHQWJRRGVFRQVLVWVRILPSRUWVWKHULVHLQSULFHV
for non-tradable goods relative to imported goods will also lead to growth in 
prices for non-tradable goods compared with investment products, which will 
cause an increase in real returns on investments in the non-tradable sector. Thus, 
in the new long-term equilibrium, the marginal product of capital in the non- 
tradable sector should decline, and capital in that sector should increase.
Assuming that products in the tradable sector (except for energy resources) 
are complete substitutes for imported products on both the global and domestic 
market, then the prices of those products will not change as a result of rising oil 
 7 The oil export duty and the mineral extraction tax in Russia reduce, to a certain extent, the effect of 
improving returns in the oil production sector in the case of rising global oil prices. It should be noted that, 
in the opinion of the paper’s authors (Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2012), the oil export duty has led to 
DQ XQSUHFHGHQWHG ORQJWHUP VXEVLGL]DWLRQ RI WKHLQHI¿FLHQW5XVVLDQ RLO UH¿QLQJ VHFWRU DQG WKHFDQFHOODWLRQ
RIWKHRLOH[SRUWGXW\LVDQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHIRULQFUHDVLQJWKHHQHUJ\HI¿FLHQF\RIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\DQG
HOLPLQDWLQJWKHEDFNZDUGQHVVRILWVRLOUH¿QLQJLQGXVWU\
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prices and will be equal to the prices of imported products. At the same time, an 
increase in the price of investment goods in this sector is possible, which will lead 
to a reduction in capital within it.
)URPWKHDERYHLWIROORZVWKDWZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQRID¿[HGYROXPHRIODERU
in each sector and with the quite standard assumption of a small open economy 
ZLWKIUHHFDSLWDOÀRZVLQDORQJWHUPHTXLOLEULXPZLWKKLJKHURLOSULFHVZHZLOO
see a higher level of capital and output in the oil-producing sector and in non-
tradable sectors. In the tradable goods sector, except for energy resources, capital 
and output are both likely to decline.
It should be noted that if in the arguments above we abandon the assumption 
WKDWWKHYROXPHRIODERULV¿[HGLQHDFKVHFWRUDQGDVVXPHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIUH-
GLVWULEXWLQJODERUEHWZHHQSDUWLFXODUVHFWRUVWKHQVWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV³WKHYROXPH
RIFDSLWDOZLOOLQFUHDVHGHFUHDVH´FDQEHUHSODFHGZLWKVWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV³WKH
FDSLWDO±ODERU UDWLRSHUZRUNHUZLOO LQFUHDVHGHFUHDVH´JLYHQVWDQGDUGDVVXPS-
tions for the type of production function. In other words, the assumed absence of 
ODERUPRELOLW\GRHVQRWLQÀXHQFHWKHJHQHUDOLW\RIWKHGLVFXVVLRQDQGLVSURYLGHG
here only for the sake of simplicity.
,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWLQWKHJHQHUDOFDVHDVLJQL¿FDQWUHGLVWULEXWLRQRIODERU
between particular sectors of the economy is possible. At the same time, we will 
observe an increase in the capital–labor ratio per worker in the oil-producing and 
non-tradable goods sectors and, possibly, a certain reduction in the capital–labor 
ratio in the tradable goods sector, except for energy resources. The most likely is 
the transfer of labor to the oil-producing and non-tradable sectors of the economy , 
provided the elasticity of substitution between imported goods and non-tradable 
goods is not high.
On the whole, if labor productivity is improving at the same rate in all sectors, 
WKHQZLWKVXI¿FLHQWO\UHDOLVWLFDVVXPSWLRQVKLJKHURLOSULFHVZLOOFRUUHVSRQGWR
a higher level of real GDP at a constant aggregate volume of labor due to the in-
crease of the capital–labor ratio in the oil-producing and non-tradable goods 
sectors .7KXVLQWKHPRGHORIDVPDOORSHQHFRQRP\ZLWKIUHHFDSLWDOÀRZVZH
can see a positive correlation between global oil prices and the GDP in a long-
term equilibrium.
In the case where labor productivity in the tradable goods sector (except for 
energy resources) grows more rapidly than in other sectors of the economy, 
higher global oil prices may have the adverse effect of Dutch disease on the long-
term development of an oil-exporting economy due to the diversion of produc-
tion factors from that sector.
7KHLPSDFWRIJOREDORLOSULFHVRQWKHWUDMHFWRU\RIUHFRYHU\JURZWK
following a transformational recession
As noted above, for accumulated capital to be allocated to a small open economy 
ZLWKIUHHFDSLWDOÀRZVLWVUHWXUQVRQLQYHVWPHQWVKRXOGQRWH[FHHGWKHUDWHRIUH-
  A conceptually greater transfer of wealth from abroad may discourage domestic economic agents from 
working, i.e., households may decrease their labor supply because of the income effect (see, for example, 
the results of a quantitative simulation analysis in the following papers: (Polbin, 2013; Polbin and Drobyshevsky, 
2014), which will have a negative impact on output in the future.
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turns on investment in foreign assets. In practice, the returns on investment in 
SK\VLFDOFDSLWDO IRU WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\GXULQJ WKH¿UVWKDOIRI WKHV LH
GXULQJWKHSHULRGRIUHFRYHU\JURZWKDIWHUWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOUHFHVVLRQVLJQL¿-
cantly exceeded the rate of return abroad (even with greater investment risk).
+LJKUDWHVRIUHWXUQFRXOGEHH[SODLQHGIRUH[DPSOHE\WKHORZYROXPHRI
capital effectively involved in the production process. The total volume of capital 
LQ WKHHFRQRP\PD\ KDYH EHHQ VXI¿FLHQWO\ KLJK LQ WKH¿UVW KDOI RI WKHV
EXWLWZDVREVROHWHDQGLQHI¿FLHQWO\GLVWULEXWHGEHWZHHQVSHFL¿FLQGXVWULHVDQG
companies. Strictly speaking, with a low volume of effectively deployed capital 
the marginal product of capital is high and  the rate of return on investment in 
the domestic economy is high as well. According to the basic models of growth 
in a closed economy, this situation will feature a certain transitional trend to-
wards a long-term rate of capital accumulation (constant capital–labor ratio per 
worker). On this transitional path, we will observe accelerated (as compared with 
the long-term) GDP growth rates declining over time towards a long-term level 
determined by the growth rates of labor productivity and the population.
,Q WKHFDVHRIDQRSHQHFRQRP\ZLWKIUHHFDSLWDOÀRZVGRPHVWLFHFRQRPLF
agents could borrow scarce capital from abroad and make a faster transition to 
WKHORQJWHUPOHYHORIFDSLWDO+RZHYHULQUHDOLW\WKLVVRXUFHRIIXQGLQJLVVLJQL
¿FDQWO\OLPLWHGEHFDXVHIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVPD\LPSRVHDQH[FHVVLYHULVNSUHPLXP
when investing in Russian assets.
This means that an increase in oil prices leads to the emergence of an addi-
tional investment-funding source. Thus, price growth may accelerate the transi-
tion to a long-term level of capital and result in higher economic growth rates 
during the transition period (recovery growth). On this transitional path, the re-
turn on capital will decline until it reaches a level where domestic investors are 
indifferent between investing in domestic or foreign assets. Upon completion of 
the transition, the economy will grow at a moderate pace corresponding to that 
of labor productivity growth. At the same time, upon completion of the tran-
VLWLRQ UHWXUQV RQ LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKHGRPHVWLF HFRQRP\PD\ DOVR VLJQL¿FDQWO\
exceed returns on investment in foreign assets as a result of higher risk. In 
this case, to further narrow the interest rate gap against the need to accelerate 
growth, institutional reforms should be carried out to reduce the systemic risk in 
the domestic economy.
On the path of recovery growth (transition from one equilibrium path to an-
RWKHUWKHUHLVDOVRWKHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRURIWKHLPSHUIHFWQDWXUHRI¿QDQFLDOPDU-
NHWVIRUFLQJFRPSDQLHVWRIXQGDVLJQL¿FDQWVKDUHRIWKHLULQYHVWPHQWVDWWKHLU
own expense rather than with borrowed funds. For example, the imperfect nature 
RIWKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWPD\OHDGWRWKHYHU\UHDOVLWXDWLRQLQWKHHFRQRP\ZKHUH
companies can only take out loans to fund investments against the collateral of 
WKHLURZQH[LVWLQJFDSLWDO,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHH[LVWHQFHRI¿QDQFLDOLPSHUIHFWLRQV
LQWKHPDUNHWPD\VLJQL¿FDQWO\VORZGRZQUHFRYHU\JURZWK
,QWXUQLQDVLWXDWLRQZLWKLPSHUIHFWLRQVLQ¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVWKHRQJRLQJULVH
in global oil prices may largely accelerate the recovery of the Russian economy 
  The need to carry out institutional reforms to stimulate the growth of the Russian economy has been noted 
LQWKHIROORZLQJSDSHUV9HGHYDQG.RVDUHY'URE\VKHYVN\DQG6LQHOQLNRY0XU\OHY,GULVRYDQG
Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2014; Mau, 2007, 2013; Radygin and Entov, 2005).
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after the transformational recession. First, the price of equity capital of compa-
QLHVSRVLWLYHO\LQÀXHQFHGE\LQFUHDVLQJJOREDORLOSULFHVVKRXOGULVHTXLWHUDSLGO\
and the value of native capital and potential collateral should grow, improving 
the opportunity to fund investments with borrowed funds.
Second, rising oil prices may be accompanied by growth in revenues for do-
mestic companies. These include both companies in exporting sectors, where 
product prices have risen on the international market, and businesses operating 
in the domestic market, whose products may have grown in demand (primarily 
from the government and households due to increased revenues as a result of 
rising global oil prices, and from sectors expanding their production). Revenues 
for domestic companies may increase in the short term due to higher prices for 
their products and to sales growth — if the factors of production in the economy 
are not fully utilized, which was characteristic of the Russian economy in 
the early 2000s. Consequently, companies may allocate these extra revenues to 
VHOI¿QDQFLQJLQYHVWPHQWIXUWKHUJURZLQJWKHLUHTXLW\DQGLPSURYLQJRSSRUWXQL-
ties to fund investments with borrowed funds.
Third, the very increase in global oil prices may decrease the national risk pre-
mium applied by foreign investors to investments in Russian assets, and thus 
reduce the cost of foreign loans for companies to fund their investments.
Thus, the increase in global oil prices in the 2000s may have had a substantial 
positive effect on the very pace of economic recovery following the transforma-
tional recession and predetermined the close correlation between the growth rate 
and oil prices. Consequently, the current positive correlation between changes in 
real GDP and oil prices may be mistaken in the empirical papers in terms of a long-
term dependency in retrospect, even though it may not exist at the theoretical level 
at all. In a more general case, when there is an actual long-term correlation between 
global oil prices and real GDP, econometric estimates made during the observed 
UHFRYHU\JURZWKSHULRGZLOOYHU\OLNHO\\LHOGLQÀDWHGUDWLRVLQWKDWFRUUHODWLRQ
To sum up, we should say that regression estimates throughout the historical 
 period of correlation between domestic GDP and global oil prices will produce 
a certain mean value for the impact of global oil prices on output that ranges between 
a stronger effect during recovery growth, and a weaker effect under economic con-
ditions once that recovery growth is complete. A more precise econometric model 
would have time-varying ratios for the impact of oil prices on the growth rate in 
output.
.H\QHVLDQDVSHFWVRIWKHLPSDFWRIJOREDORLOSULFHVRQ*'3
%HIRUH FRQWLQXLQJ RXU UHYLHZRI WKHLPSDFW RI WKHWKHRUHWLFDO DVVXPSWLRQV IRU
the correlation between oil prices and output, we should take time to describe 
the short-term mechanics. If the factors of production are not fully utilized in an 
economy, theoretically, output may change simultaneously with an increase in oil 
prices, due to a greater capital deployment and more hours worked. In the basic 
Keynesian model of aggregate demand and supply, the aggregate supply curve is 
ÀDWZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHVLWXDWLRQZKHUHQRPLQDOSULFHVDQGZDJHVDUHFRP-
pletely rigid and the economy has a high volume of idle factors of production: capi-
tal and labor. Accordingly, output in the Keynesian model may be determined to 
DJUHDWHUH[WHQWE\FKDQJHVLQWKHDJJUHJDWHVXSSO\WKDQE\ÀXFWXDWLRQVLQRLOSULFHV
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7KH PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ SXUVXHG E\ WKH%DQN RI 5XVVLD LQ WKHV EHIRUH
WKHJOREDO ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV PD\ EH FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV DSROLF\ RI DFRQWUROOHG
QRPLQDO UXEOH H[FKDQJH UDWHZLWK FHUWDLQ VWHSV WRZDUGV LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHWLQJ DQG
DV DÀRDWLQJ UXEOH H[FKDQJH UDWH DIWHU WKH FULVLV VHH HJ'URE\VKHYVN\
'URE\VKHYVN\HWDO8O\XNDHYHWDO<XGDHYDHWDO:H
ZLOOQRZFRQVLGHUDK\SRWKHWLFDOVLWXDWLRQZKHUHQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHLV¿[HG
nominal indicators are completely rigid, the economy has a high volume of unused 
(or  underutilized) factors of production and global oil prices are constantly rising. 
The increase in oil prices would correspond to the growth in aggregate income 
for domestic economic agents and to an increase in demand for imported as well 
as domestic goods. At the same time, aggregate demand between those groups of 
goods would be distributed depending on preferences and relative prices.
,Q WKHFDVH RI DÀRDWLQJ QRPLQDO H[FKDQJH UDWH DQG ULVLQJ JOREDO RLO SULFHV
the nominal exchange rate in an oil-producing economy strengthens rapidly, leading 
to an increase in the real exchange rate, relative prices for domestic goods compared 
with imported goods, and aggregate demand — largely due to imported goods.
,Q WKHFDVHRI D¿[HGQRPLQDO H[FKDQJH UDWH UHODWLYHSULFHVZLOOQRW FKDQJH
LQ WKHVKRUWWHUPDVVXPLQJ WKHLU ULJLGLW\DQGDFFRUGLQJO\ZHZLOOVHHVLJQL¿-
FDQWJURZWKLQGHPDQGIRUGRPHVWLFJRRGVZKLFKDVVXPLQJDÀDWVXSSO\FXUYH
will lead to growth in the output of domestic goods. Output growth will occur to 
the extent determined by unused factors of production. It will cause an increase 
in the income of economic agents while also raising demand for domestic goods, 
and, accordingly, providing a multiplier effect for the increasing income on output.
Another growth mechanism in the demand for domestic goods in the short run is 
investor demand, which will increase in the current period to enable the opportu nity 
for transitioning to the optimal level of capital in the future. In other words, growth 
LQ ³VKRUWWHUP´ LQYHVWRU GHPDQGZLOO DGGLWLRQDOO\ LQFUHDVH RXWSXW LQ WKHFXUUHQW
period, as investment goods must actually be produced, whereas an increase in 
³ORQJWHUP´LQYHVWRUGHPDQGZLOOOHDGWRDPRUHHI¿FLHQWXWLOL]DWLRQRISURGXFWLRQ
factors over a certain period. At the same time, more intensively utilizing factors of 
production, i.e., an increase in hours worked, will subsequently lead to an increase 
in the marginal product of capital, which may multiply the growth in investments.
,ILQDGGLWLRQWRWKHDERYHGRPHVWLFHFRQRPLFDJHQWVH[SHFWLQÀDWLRQWRDF-
celerate in the future because from a short-term perspective nominal prices and 
wages will adjust to a higher level of equilibrium, then the real interest rate will 
GHFUHDVHDJDLQVWD¿[HGQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHDQGDUHDOL]HGXQFRYHUHGSDULW\RI
interest rates.10 This, in turn, may provide an even greater incentive for consumer 
and investor demand in the short term and, accordingly, increase output.
,Q RWKHU ZRUGV LQ WKH.H\QHVLDQ PRGHO DVLJQL¿FDQW LQFUHDVH LQ RXWSXW LV
possible due to the utilization of production factors in the short term, whereas 
the short-term contribution from the change in global oil prices to the real GDP 
may far exceed the long-term contribution under an expansionist monetary policy.
2QWKHZKROHLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIDÀDWDJJUHJDWHVXS-
ply curve is quite unrealistic from a short-term perspective. In more general as-
sumptions, the supply curve will have a positive incline whose magnitude will 
 10 This corresponds to the equality of Russian and global nominal interest rates, with a possible adjustment for 
the risk premium on investments in Russian assets.
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depend on the rigidity of wages and prices and on how quickly companies are 
able to intensify the utilization of production factors. The angle of the aggregate 
supply curve largely determines the quantitative effect of changes in oil prices on 
the output of the Russian economy from a short-term perspective.
The magnitude of short-term changes in aggregate demand against rising oil 
prices may also be highly limited, e.g., due to certain intertemporal consump-
WLRQKDELWVRIKRXVHKROGVDQGGXHWRFDSLWDODGMXVWPHQWFRVWV ,Q WKH¿UVWFDVH
households may see a disadvantage in an excessively rapid increase in their con-
sumption to a level corresponding to permanent income and will begin to adjust 
their consumption to the long-term level gradually, thereby reducing the effect 
of increasing oil prices on consumer demand. In the second case, the excessively 
UDSLGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRILQYHVWPHQWVLQWR¿[HGFDSLWDODQGWKHH[FHVVLYHO\UDSLG
JURZWK LQ LQYHVWPHQW H[SHQVHVPD\ EH DFFRPSDQLHG E\ VLJQL¿FDQW FRVWV DQG
ORVVHV LQ WKHHI¿FLHQF\ RI WKHLU VSHQGLQJ$FFRUGLQJO\ FRPSDQLHVPD\ SUHIHU
a more gradual capital accumulation.
6. An illustration of the impact of oil prices on basic macroeconomic 
YDULDEOHVLQWKHG\QDPLFPRGHORIJHQHUDOHTXLOLEULXP
The above reasoning leads us to conclude that the trajectory of response by do-
mestic output to shocks in the terms of trade (permanently rising oil prices) may 
take quite a remarkable shape. The mechanics of impact and the assumptions that 
would produce a given effect are rather diverse. In this case, the answer to the ques-
tion regarding which mechanism for correlating between rising oil prices and out-
put would have the most substantial effect appears to be more of an ideological than 
HFRQRPLFPDWWHUDWDWKHRUHWLFDOOHYHO)RUDTXDQWLWDWLYHLOOXVWUDWLRQRUYHUL¿FDWLRQ
of hypotheses, scholars normally turn to empirical studies or to quantitative simula-
tion analysis within adjusted models of general equilibrium. We will do the same.
To illustrate the short-term and long-term effects of changing oil prices on ba-
sic macroeconomic variables, we will consider a rather stylized dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model (DSGE). This model is an extension of a model built in 
Polbin (2014) to a steady-state growth model with a stochastic trend in labor produc-
WLYLW\DQGZLWKUDQGRPO\ÀRDWLQJSULFHVRIH[SRUWHGJRRGVLQUHODWLRQWRLPSRUWHG
goods (we will associate those prices with oil prices for the sake of simplicity).
The model distinguishes between goods in the export-oriented sector (EOS) and 
the domestic-oriented sector (DOS) of the Russian economy. The output volume 
of the export-oriented sector is determined exogenously, which, to a certain ex-
tent, reduces the utility of the model but enables us to obtain a permitted, time-
invariable model of steady-state growth and to analyze the impact of an increase 
in permanent income due to the appreciation of exported goods on the output of 
the domestic-oriented sector of the economy and other macroeconomic variables.
The model has a broad range of tools for describing the short-term behavior of 
macroeconomic variables within the Keynesian mechanisms described above. In 
particular, the model assumes that nominal prices and wages are not completely 
rigid in the short run; there is also the assumption of endogenous capital utilization 
and an endogenous supply of labor, intertemporal consumption habits of house-
holds, and investment adjustment costs. The behavior of the macroeconomic sys-
tem is determined based on the optimizing activity of households and companies. 
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The numeric simulation analysis was carried out based on the assumption that 
WKHFHQWUDOEDQNLVSXUVXLQJD¿[HGQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHSROLF\11
Now we will describe the impact of changes in global oil prices within the frame-
work of the suggested model. The functions of impulse responses to a 10% rise in 
global oil prices in the DSGE model of the basic macroeconomic variables are 
SUHVHQWHGLQ)LJ7KHWLPHSHULRGDORQJWKH;D[LVLVRQHTXDUWHU7KH<D[LVUHS-
resents the percentage contribution of the oil price shock to the trend of the giv-
HQYDULDEOH GHVFULEHGDERYH7KXV WKH¿UVW WRS OHIWJUDSKGHPRQVWUDWHV WKDW
the simulated shock in oil prices represents a permanent 10% increase.
$V WKH¿JXUH VKRZVPDQ\PDFURHFRQRPLFYDULDEOHVGHPRQVWUDWH DGRPHOLNH
response during the transition to a new long-term equilibrium, i.e., in the beginning 
ZHFDQVHHWKHHIIHFWRI³PLVVLQJ´WKLVQHZORQJWHUPHTXLOLEULXP7KXVWKHFRQ-
 11 A detailed description of the model can be found in Polbin (2014).
Fig. The functions of impulse response to a 10% increase in global oil prices, obtained based on a simulation 
analysis using the DSGE model with a broad range of real and nominal rigidities.
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tribution to the increase in output by the domestic-oriented sector in response to 
the 10% positive shock of oil prices reaches the level of approximately 3% a year, 
following which the contribution to output growth begins to decline  towards 
the long-term level of approximately 1%. The long-term impact on the output of 
a given sector is determined by the various mechanisms described in section three of 
this paper, namely increases in relative prices within the sector in a long-term equi-
librium, improving its returns and encouraging capital accumulation.  Accordingly, 
the contribution of permanently rising global oil prices to the growth rate in a given 
VHFWRU¶VRXWSXWZLOOEHSRVLWLYHGXULQJWKH¿UVW\HDUDIWHUZKLFKZHZLOOVHHDQHJD-
tive contribu tion to the output growth rate.
7KHRXWSXWWUHQGVKRZQLQWKH¿JXUHVLVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHIROORZLQJIDFWRUV,Q
the short term, in response to increasing consumer and investor demand for domestic 
goods, businesses expand their production capacity through more  intensive capital 
utilization and increasing hours worked. At the same time, the increases in the com-
ponents of demand will only become noticeable after a certain period of time due to 
the gradual adjustment of consumption and investments to rising oil prices, deter-
mined by intertemporal consumption habits and capital adjustment costs.
Real wages, domestic goods prices and the real exchange rate will adjust over 
time to a new long-term level, resulting in rising relative prices for domestic 
goods compared with imported goods, leading to a redistribution of the increased 
demand in favor of imported goods over the long term. Capital utilization and 
hours worked will return to an old level, and long-term growth in output will be 
achieved through increased physical capital.
Assuming that economic agents perceive rising global oil prices as temporary 
and realize only later that, in fact, the change in global oil prices is permanent, 
the magnitude of short-term responses will be reduced for all variables. This hap-
pens because, according to household perceptions, their permanent income increas-
es more slowly in the case considered, and accordingly, they will increase current 
GHPDQGPRUHVORZO\DQGVDYHPRUHRQIRUHLJQPDUNHWV%XVLQHVVHVLQWXUQDUH
LQFOLQHGWREHOLHYHWKDWWKHÀRZRIPDUJLQDOSURGXFWVRIFDSLWDOLVQRWVRVLJQL¿FDQW
under a temporary increase in oil prices, thereby reducing investment incentives.
Indeed, if businesses consider currently rising global oil prices to be a temporary 
VLWXDWLRQWKHTXHVWLRQDULVHVDVWRWKHH[SHGLHQF\RIEXLOGLQJDUH¿QHU\RUGULOO-
ing a new oil well, as they expect oil prices to return to an old level at the moment 
their newly built facilities are put into operation.
Moreover, rising global oil prices may lead to an increase in costs for compa-
nies, resulting from the appreciation of resources. Against such an unfavorable 
shock in prices for intermediate products used in production, costs will increase 
at any volume of output. This, in turn, may lead to price increases and a decrease 
in production12.D]DNRYDHWDO
$QDVSHFWUHTXLULQJDPRUHWKRURXJKUHYLHZLVWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIWKH%DQNRI5XVVLD
WRDQLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJUHJLPHDQGDÀRDWLQJQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHIRUWKHUXEOH
This regime of monetary policy may substantially deteriorate the short-term impact 
RIJOREDORLOSULFHVRQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\6SHFL¿FDOO\LQFUHDVLQJRLOSULFHVZLOO
 12 $QH[DPSOHRIVXFKDVKRFNLVWKHHQHUJ\FULVLVRIWKHVDVZHOODVWKHULVHLQJOREDORLOSULFHVIURP
WRZKHQVRDULQJRLOSULFHVOHGWRDVXEVWDQWLDOLQFUHDVHLQFRVWVIRUEXVLQHVVHVPDLQO\LQWKHRLODQG
JDVVHFWRUUHVXOWLQJLQDFFHOHUDWHGLQÀDWLRQ
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lead to a rapid improvement in the nominal exchange rate for the ruble and, accord-
ingly, to fast strengthening of the real exchange rate and to growth in real wages, 
resulting in increased demand (due to the rising incomes of economic agents), to 
a greater extent for imported goods than for those produced domestically.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted a theoretical analysis of and considered the me-
chanics behind the positive correlation between the output of the Russian econo-
my and global oil prices. We provided theoretical considerations in the context of 
basic neoclassical models of economic growth in favor of a positive correlation 
between the real GDP and global oil prices, i.e., higher oil prices will correspond 
to a higher level of production of goods and services by the domestic economy, 
as well as greater wealth for Russian economic agents.
At the same time, long-term economic growth rates do not depend on oil prices 
EXW DUH GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKHJURZWK UDWH LQ WKHHI¿FLHQF\ RI SURGXFWLRQ IDFWRUV
The effect of oil prices on the output growth rate may be observed only from 
a short-term perspective, during the transition from a long-term equilibrium at 
one level of oil prices to a long-term equilibrium at another level of oil prices.
Accordingly, an increase in oil prices will lead to an accelerated economic growth 
rate only in the short term. Thus, a rather close correlation between the real GDP 
growth rate for the Russian economy and oil prices during their explosive growth 
in the 2000s, which may be perceived as a dependency of the output growth rate on 
global oil prices, was actually the result of a certain transitional change.
The paper puts forward theoretical arguments proving that the impact of 
changing global oil prices was greater during the recovery growth period, when 
the factors of production were not fully utilized, compared with their impact in 
WKHFXUUHQWHFRQRPLFHQYLURQPHQW7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHLQÀXHQFHRIFKDQJHVLQ
global oil prices on output has substantially diminished over time.
The paper also contains a detailed analysis of the Keynesian mechanics of 
the impact of global oil prices on the output of the Russian economy from a short-
term perspective. Given a controlled nominal rate for the ruble, in the short term, 
we may see an economic boom caused by the improvement in terms of trade and 
the transfer of income to the Russian economy, and the short-term contribution of 
changing global oil prices to the trend in real GDP will far exceed the long-term 
contribution.
At the same time, we will observe a positive contribution of increasing oil 
prices to the GDP growth rate from a short-term perspective, during the cycli-
cal rise and overheating of the economy, i.e., output will be above the potential 
level during a certain period of time. Accordingly, we may observe a negative im-
pact on the GDP growth rate from rising global oil prices in the medium term, as 
the economy returns to the potential level of output. Accordingly, the slowdown 
of growth in the current economic environment is partly the result of the inertial 
adjustment of the economy after overheating, caused by the upsurge in global 
prices during the 2000s.
,QWKHFDVHRILQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJWKHVKRUWWHUPLPSDFWRIJOREDORLOSULFHVRQ
WKHRXWSXWRIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\PD\GHFUHDVHVLJQL¿FDQWO\8QGHUFRQGLWLRQV
RIKLJKYRODWLOLW\LQJOREDORLOSULFHVWUDQVLWLRQWRWKHLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJUHJLPH
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DQG ÀRDWLQJ H[FKDQJH UDWHZLOO OHDG WR DGHFUHDVH LQ WKHVKRUWWHUP LPSDFW RI
changing oil prices on output and other macroeconomic indicators which, no 
doubt, is a positive aspect of the monetary policy that may encourage a reduc-
tion in the volatility of the Russian economy and result in improving public well-
being. At the same time, however, it should be noted that following the tradition 
RI/XFDV¶FULWLTXHDFKDQJHLQHFRQRPLFSROLF\ZLOO OHDGWRFKDQJHVLQ
the correlation between macroeconomic indicators. In other words, using esti-
mates of empirical correlation between domestic output and oil prices based on 
historical data under the controlled nominal ruble rate regime is incorrect when 
IRUHFDVWLQJXQGHUDPRQHWDU\SROLF\WDNLQJVKDSHDVWKHLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJDQG
ÀRDWLQJUDWHUHJLPH7KLVDSSURDFKPD\OHDGWRLQFRUUHFWIRUHFDVWVRIFKDQJHVLQ
WKH5XVVLDQPDFURHFRQRPLFV\VWHPDQGWRDQLQHI¿FLHQWPDFURHFRQRPLFSROLF\
%DVHG RQ WKHDERYH UHVXOWV LQ HVWLPDWLQJ WKHLPSDFW RI JOREDO RLO SULFHV RQ
economic growth in Russia, we can also formulate a conclusion on the need to re-
duce the Russian economy’s dependence on the global trade environment and to 
develop an economic policy aimed at achieving steady growth rates over a long-
term perspective. In this regard, considerable attention should be paid to growth 
factors in the context of supply, including improvements in the institutional en-
vironment and in the investment attractiveness of the Russian economy, the de-
velopment of infrastructure, the reduction of market monopolization, increases 
in the mobility of production factors, the encouragement of innovative activities 
and improvements in human capital.
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